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a b s t r a c t 
In the domain of classical economic games, it has previously been suggested that devia- 
tions from purely rational behavior could be explained by a lack of experimenter-subject 
anonymity. In fact, some experiments show that contributions and prosocial behavior in- 
crease when participants feel observed. In the present study, we investigate whether mea- 
sures of enhanced anonymity, beyond a conventional standard, are necessary in the par- 
ticular case of tax behavior experiments. This issue might be pivotal for both the validity 
and generalizability of existing published studies as well as for designing future studies. 
We suspect social desirability to be even more relevant in experiments on tax compliance, 
which often apply a context-rich setting, entailing a strong ethical component. Interest- 
ingly, certain common experimental practices reflect potential breaches of anonymity dur- 
ing sign-up, the actual task, and the payment phase. Accordingly, we tested whether (1) 
tax compliance is higher under conditions of regular anonymity compared to enhanced 
anonymity, and (2) whether this anonymity manipulation moderates established effects of 
tax-related parameters, such as audit probability and fine rate. Despite an enhanced per- 
ception of anonymity due to our manipulation, we did not observe a difference in relative 
tax compliance between the regular and enhanced anonymity conditions. Additionally, en- 
hanced anonymity did not interact with the effects of tax rate, audit probability, and fine 
level on tax compliance. We conclude that commonly used procedures in tax experiments 
are sufficient to guarantee a satisfactory level of anonymity. 
© 2020 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. 
This is an open access article under the CC BY license. 





Lab experiments are a key source of knowledge in the social sciences in general ( Falk and Heckman, 2009 ) and are
widespread in research on tax behavior ( Muehlbacher and Kirchler, 2016 ). The key strengths of tax experiments are their
high internal validity and relative cost-efficiency in studying compliance behavior. Most importantly, in contrast to other
widespread empirical research methods (e.g., cross-sectional surveys and administrative data sources) the systematic ma- ∗ Corresponding author. 
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nipulation (i.e., variation) of relevant factors in lab experiments allows for causal interpretations. At the same time, tax
experiments have also been criticized for their assumed low external validity as decision environments in the lab are more
artificial and typically lack meaningful real-world consequences. 
Considering, for instance, tax-related decisions in private households, it is striking that these decisions are made in
private and that they include a strong ethical component. Being or feeling observed can substantially influence perfor-
mance, decision making, and voicing opinions (see for instance Becker and Marique, 2014 ; Horwitz and McCaffrey, 2008 ;
Joinson, 1999 ), so there might be systematic differences between tax decisions in the private household compared to those
taken in the lab. Accordingly, one study showed that giving participants a week to make their tax reporting decisions at
home significantly decreased tax compliance rates ( Cadsby et al., 2006 ). Potential explanations for this finding include
spending more time to make the compliance decision or having contact with other people and maybe even discussing
the decision at hand. However, it is also possible that the physical absence of the experimenter accounts for the effect on
compliance. 
In line with this argument, a number of studies reveal that people behave differently when feeling observed in compar-
ison to feeling unobserved (e.g., Forgas et al., 1980 ; Froming et al., 1982 ; Triplett, 1898 ; van Bommel, van Prooijen, Elffers,
and van Lange, 2012 ; Zajonc, 1965 ). Often these changes in behavior are driven by strategic motives (e.g., Eagly et al., 1978 )
and image concerns (e.g., Levitt and List, 2007 ; Silverman et al., 2014 ). However, different behavior when feeling observed
can also represent spontaneous reactions that do not involve conscious attempts to please the observers (e.g., Noah et al.,
2018 ). Accordingly, people presumably adopt an external perspective of themselves ( Hass, 1984 ) and show a tendency to
neglect internal information ( Scheier and Carver, 1980 ; Wicklund and Duval, 1971 ). This leads to judgments and decisions
being biased towards information that is also visible to the potential observers (Steinmetz, Xu, Fishbach, & Zhang, 2016). 
These findings are relevant for lab experiments, where participants often engage with the experimenter, for instance
when being assigned a computer/cubicle, when asking questions about the procedure, or when receiving their payoff in
case of monetary incentives, which is a widespread approach in tax experiments. It would be plausible that such interac-
tions influence compliance decisions. First, they can activate a normative decision context, influencing participants’ compli-
ance decisions because they feel more observed and accountable in the presence of the experimenter. Additionally, when
monetary incentives are decision-contingent, the experimenter can usually deduce from the final payment amount whether
a participant evaded tax or not. Participants who realize this could be hesitant to reveal their true preference of evasion,
fearing implicit moral judgement from the experimenter or other participants when receiving their payoff. Second, while
participants are usually guaranteed anonymity in the sense that true identities are unknown to the experimenter, they
might mistrust the procedures and hold the belief that, for instance, student IDs used for study sign-up or signatures on
consent forms and payoff sheets could be linked to collected data and used to reveal their identity. If participants were to
hold such concerns, decision outcomes could be biased towards more socially desirable decisions. That is, an enhanced level
of compliance and less susceptibility to the experimental manipulations, ultimately resulting in elevated compliance or even
ceiling effects. 
Being aware of these potentially detrimental effects, some researchers in the field of tax behavior address such con-
cerns in their procedures. For instance, they carefully consider possible breaches of experimenter-subject anonymity (here-
after simply referred to as anonymity ) and try to ensure an environment of pronounced anonymity in the lab. In this vein,
some experimenters explicitly mention that they omit the collection of any real names and assign IDs to participants (e.g.,
Alm et al., 2010 ; Blaufus et al., 2016 ; Choo et al., 2016 ; Christian and Alm, 2014 ; Kastlunger et al., 2009 ; Mittone et al.,
2017 ; Papoutsi et al., 2015 ; Watrin and Ullmann, 2004 ; Zhang et al., 2016 ). Other experimenters refrain from having par-
ticipants sign a consent form to guarantee anonymity (e.g., Alm et al., 2017 ; Alm et al., 2010 ). Furthermore, there are even
experimenters applying double-blind payment procedures, for instance, by placing sealed envelopes for each participation
ID in the department’s administrative office to be collected after the experiment (e.g., Alm et al., 2010 ; Choo et al., 2016 ;
Christian and Alm, 2014 ; Mittone et al., 2017 ; Zhang et al., 2016 ). 
However, although some experiments address this problem with regard to sign-up and payment, they typically do not
tackle the potential problem of experimenter-participant interaction. Moreover, it seems that the majority of tax experiments
in the lab does not address any of these issues. They either do not explicitly refer to anonymity concerns or only provide a
generic statement that anonymity was guaranteed without specifying the respective procedures. Therefore, it often remains
unclear whether applied experimental practices are potentially biased due to an insufficient level of anonymity. 
Hence, the crucial question is whether measures of enhanced anonymity beyond a common standard are necessary in lab
experiments on tax behavior to reduce socially desirable responding. First, this is of practical relevance for experimenters
who design new experiments. Second, a clear effect of anonymity on compliance rates might contest existing results of
already published experiments that neglected these anonymity concerns. 
In the domain of classical game theoretical paradigms, the influence of varying degrees of anonymity has already at-
tracted attention. It has been suggested that deviations from what is considered purely rational behavior, for instance in
dictator games, might be explained by a potential lack of complete anonymity. There are in fact studies showing that people
are more generous towards another person when they are observed by a third person (e.g., Bull and Gibson-Robinson, 1981 ;
Kurzban, 2001 ). This is commonly attributed to the finding that cooperative behavior is often sustained by sanctions for
those who refuse to act prosocial ( Barclay, 2004 ; Fehr and Gächter, 2002 ; Milinski et al., 2002 ; Sylwester and Roberts, 2010 ;
Wedekind and Milinski, 20 0 0 ). Interestingly, Haley and Fessler (2005) showed that just presenting participants with subtle
eye-like stimuli during a dictator game is sufficient to increase contributions. Since participants in this study were explicitly









































guaranteed full anonymity, their finding was interpreted as an activation of automatic cognitive mechanisms of detecting
social gaze. This could be enough to feel observed and ultimately regulate social behavior in the direction of trying to make
a positive impression ( Izuma, 2012 ). In line with this, a number of related studies indicate that eye images can enhance
generosity and prosocial behavior in naturalistic settings ( Bateson et al., 2006 ; Ekström, 2012 ; Ernest-Jones et al., 2011 ;
Francey and Bergmüller, 2012 ; Powell et al., 2012 ). 
Nevertheless, studies on the potential effects of anonymity on contributions in economic games are somewhat incon-
clusive. While some studies suggest an influence of different degrees of anonymity on contribution behavior ( Franzen and
Pointner, 2012 ; Hoffman et al., 1994 ; Thielmann et al., 2016 ), others suggest that this is not the case ( Barmettler et al., 2012 ;
Bolton et al., 1998 ; Bolton and Zwick, 1995 ). 
Irrespective of these ambiguous results, these findings cannot be directly applied to the field of tax research, since there
are crucial differences between classical economic games and tax compliance experiments. Tax experiments are often em-
bedded in a context-rich setting. This means that tax language is used (e.g., income, tax rate, audit probability, fine) and
the decision entails a stronger ethical component, since participants are assumed to view honesty ( = full compliance) as
the socially expected behavior ( Bruttel and Friehe, 2014 ; for similar findings in a context not directly related to taxation see
Karakostas and Zizzo, 2015 ). Studies directly comparing tax-specific and context-free language mostly find higher compliance
when tax-specific language is used (e.g., Baldry, 1986 ; Choo, Fonseca, & Myles, 2015; Mittone, 2006 ̧Trivedi and Chung, 2006 ;
Wartick et al., 1999 ; Webley and Halstead, 1986 ) with a few opposite findings (e.g., Alm et al., 1992 ). These are not only
absolute differences in reported income, but also interaction effects with tax system variables ( Durham et al., 2014 ). Thus,
we believe that it is important to test effects related to anonymity concerns in a setting that applies a tax-specific context.
In such a situation, feeling observed or even judged, socially desirable responses should be more likely, especially so when
participants do not feel completely anonymous throughout the experiment. 
In order to investigate a potential effect of enhanced anonymity on compliance decisions, we conducted a conventional
income tax reporting game with varying tax-related parameters over 12 rounds (i.e., tax rate, audit probability, fine rate)
where income had to be earned with an effort t ask and monet ary incentives were decision-contingent. As a between-subject
factor, we manipulated the degree of anonymity (regular anonymity vs. enhanced anonymity; for details see method sec-
tion). Our first research question was whether compliance rates vary between different degrees of anonymity. We expected
tax compliance to be higher under conditions of regular anonymity compared to enhanced anonymity, based on the as-
sumption that socially desirable responses might become less prevalent with increasing anonymity. Second, we investigated
whether our anonymity manipulation moderates the effects of tax-related parameters on tax compliance in the experiment.
The underlying rationale is that if differing degrees of anonymity affect the overall level of compliance, it could be the case
that deterrence effects (i.e., effects of audit probabilities and fine levels) might work differently. For instance, stronger effects
of social desirability in the regular anonymity condition could mitigate the effect of deterrence on compliance compared to
a condition of enhanced anonymity. 
2. Method 
2.1. Participants 
The sample comprised 131 students. Mean age was M = 21.55 ( SD = 2.56) and 79 (60.3%) were female. All participants
were enrolled in the Psychology Bachelor Program at Tilburg University and were invited to participate in the study to earn
course credits. They were informed about additional performance-based monetary payment. About half of the participants
were international students (54.6%) and the other half Dutch (45.4%). 
The sample size resulted from the available resources and recruitment success during the two test weeks. The obtained
sample size provided a power of 0.80 to detect an effect as small as Cohen’s d = 0.49 in terms of a mean difference between
the two anonymity conditions (two-sided t -test with α = 0.05). 1 
2.2. Materials 
2.2.1. Experiment 
The study consisted of a repeated rounds tax experiment including 12 compliance decisions. Within a mixed-design, two
different degrees of anonymity were manipulated between participants (regular anonymity versus enhanced anonymity; see 
Procedure section) and three within-subject factors were fully permuted over the 12 rounds in a randomly determined fixed
order (tax-rate, 2 levels [20% or 40%]; audit probability, 3 levels [5%, 15%, or 25%]; fine rate, 2 levels [evaded tax plus a
fine of 0.5 times the evaded amount or evaded tax plus a fine of 1.5 times the evaded amount]). Hence, the scheme of the
parameters tax rate, audit probability, and fine rate over the rounds was identical for all participants in both conditions. 
All instructions and descriptions used context-rich language (i.e., a strong tax frame), in order to emphasize that individ-
uals made compliance decisions within a normative tax frame where compliance can be seen as the expected behavior. For1 Note that this might be a conservative estimate as the actual design consists of 12 repeated measures and was modeled using a linear mixed effects 
model. 








































instance, participants were informed that “the tax rate is the percentage of your income you have to pay as tax” or that the
fine is “what you have to pay in case you did not pay all of your tax due and get audited”. 
In each round, individuals received a guaranteed income of 10 0 0 experimental currency units (ECU) and had the op-
portunity to earn up to 10 0 0 ECU in addition, based on performance in a real-effort slider task. Accordingly, income could
vary between 10 0 0 and 20 0 0 ECU ( M = 1648, SD = 203). After earning their income in each round, individuals received
information about the tax rate, audit probability, and fine rate, and had to decide how much of the tax due to pay. The au-
dit mechanism was implemented in accordance with the announced deterrence parameters and feedback on whether they
were audited (and on potential fines) was provided directly after each round of tax filing. 
Tax decisions were incentivized (exchange rate: 1 Euro = 300 ECU). Remuneration was based on one randomly selected
round plus an additional show-up fee of 1 Euro. Average remuneration was M = 5.38 Euro ( SD = 1.26). 
Before the actual experiment, participants were presented with three exemplary tax rounds where they had to indicate
the resulting net income in ECU to check whether they understood the instructions. Furthermore, participants also faced
two trial rounds to make themselves familiar with the effort task and the software in general. An audit took place in the
second of these two rounds. 
2.2.2. Post-experimental questionnaire 
After the 12 rounds of the experiment, participants had to fill in a post-experimental questionnaire. The questionnaire
consisted of six blocks. In all blocks, items had to be answered on a Likert-type scale ranging from 1 = lowest agreement to
5 = highest agreement. 
First, they were presented with eight statements measuring tax attitudes in general (i.e., the moral obligation to pay taxes
and to support the principles of taxation). These items were taken from the Motivational Postures Commitment subscale
( Braithwaite, 2003 ; e.g., “Paying tax is the right thing to do.”). 
Second, individuals had to provide answers to two items on personal norms (e.g., “Do you think it is acceptable to evade
some tax?”) and to two questions about social norms toward paying tax (e.g., “Do most people think it is acceptable to
evade some tax?”). These items were constructed for the purpose of this study. 
Third, we collected basic socio-demographic information. On the same page, we asked whether participants read all
instruction carefully and asked to indicate whether they understood the instructions. 
Fourth, individuals had to provide answers to three multiple-choice attention checks for the used tax-related parameters
(i.e., “What were the different fine levels in the tax game?”) with one of the four provided options being correct. 
Fifth, participants were presented with three items measuring perceived anonymity (1) during the sign-up phase for the
study, (2) during the actual experiment in the lab, and (3) in the payment stage (e.g., “The payment procedure guarantees
my anonymity”; for details of the manipulation see next section). 
Finally, we asked participants about their perceptions and motives when deciding on whether to comply or evade. This
allows for exploring whether decisions were perceived as paying tax or rather as a game (e.g., “I perceived the decisions as
playing a game”), and whether self-stated motives were payoff maximization or rather tax honesty (e.g., “My main goal was
to maximize my payoff”). All materials were presented in English (see the OSF repository for screenshots of the instructions
and items; https://osf.io/6gu2z ). 
2.3. Procedure 
The manipulation of regular anonymity versus enhanced anonymity was implemented in three different procedural steps
of the study: (1) during the sign-up for the study, (2) during the actual experimental task, and (3) in the payment phase. 
In the regular anonymity condition, 2 individuals signed up for the study indicating their student ID number and had to
choose a time slot. When arriving at the lab to participate, individuals were assigned to a cubicle by the experimenter in
person. The lab consisted of multiple cubicles with closable doors. These doors had to stay open throughout the experi-
mental task and the experimenter answered potential questions in person 3 (“Please leave the doors of your cubicle open
during the study. In case it is closed, please open it now.”). After completion of the post-experimental questionnaire, the
payoff was displayed on the computer screen. The experimenter went to each cubicle and paid each participant in person.
Participants were informed about the payment procedure at the beginning of the experiment (“The experimenter will hand
you the money at the end of the study.”). As detailed, in the regular anonymity condition participants interacted with the
experimenter several times in person and they were aware that the experimenter will see their final payoff. 
In the enhanced anonymity condition, individuals also signed up using their student ID number. Subsequently, they re-
ceived an email stating that their student ID number would not be used in the study and that there would be no personal
interaction with an experimenter, both to ensure complete anonymity. In the same email, participants were instructed to
select one of the available cubicles and then close the cubicle door once they arrive at the lab. A large poster in the arrival
room of the lab also displayed this information in case someone did not remember these instructions and they were also
mentioned in the experimental instructions (e.g., “Please make sure the door of your cubicle is closed during the study.2 The normative term regular reflects that this is close to how we would typically conduct a tax experiment in the lab. 
3 We left the doors open in this experimental condition to account for the fact that in many labs cubicles are not closable. 
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In case it is currently open, please close it now.”). Additionally, individuals were informed that there was an experimenter
present in the control room who could be contacted via an intercom system in case of any problems, but they would not see
this person otherwise, as there were blinds on all windows of the control room (“…There will be an experimenter present
in the control room in case you run into any problems, but if there are no problems you will not have any contact with
the experimenter to ensure anonymity…). To ensure full anonymity during payment, we placed a sticker with a random
number-letter code in each cubicle. Individuals were instructed to enter this code at the beginning of the experimental task
and to take the code with them afterwards. From 30 min after the completion of the study onward, they could collect an
envelope marked with their random number-letter code containing their remuneration in the arrival room of the lab. 
Comparing the two conditions, during the sign-up phase participants in the enhanced anonymity condition entered their
student ID number, but were informed that it would not be used for any other purpose than crediting mandatory lab hours,
whereas participants in the regular anonymity condition did not receive such specific information. During the experiment,
individuals in the enhanced anonymity condition did not interact with the experimenter at all and sat in cubicles they se-
lected with closed doors. In the regular anonymity condition, individuals were assigned by the experimenter and the door
remained open. During payment, participants in the enhanced anonymity received their remuneration based on unmatch-
able random codes and without any interaction with the experimenter. Participants in the regular anonymity condition
received their money from the experimenter in person. Note that participants in both conditions were fully informed about
these procedures before making their tax compliance decisions in the experiment and completing the post-experimental
questionnaire. 
Sessions of one condition were run for a whole day. To rule out potential date effects on condition assignment, we ran
the experiment over the course of two weeks, counterbalancing the weekdays per condition. 
Data and R code can be downloaded from https://osf.io/6gu2z . 
3. Results 
The results are divided into three sections. First, we tested whether the manipulation of regular versus enhanced
anonymity was successful. Second, we ran three regression models to test the effects of the anonymity manipulation, the
tax-related parameters, and their interaction on tax compliance. Third, we conducted further exploratory analyses. 
3.1. Manipulation check 
To test whether the manipulation of regular versus enhanced anonymity was successful, we ran a MANOVA with the
anonymity condition as independent variable and the three manipulation check item scores as dependent variables. Fig. 1
shows the perceived anonymity by condition for each of the three items. Results indicate that overall experienced anonymity
was higher in the enhanced than in the regular anonymity condition, F (3, 127) = 7.34, p < .001, η2 = 0.15, indicating a
successful manipulation of anonymity. 
Univariate analyses by item revealed that the two conditions did not differ significantly from each other in the extent
of perceived anonymity during the sign-up phase, F (1, 129) = 2.38, p = .126, η2 = 0.02, but during the experiment, F (1,
129) = 8.31, p = .005, η2 = 0.06, and when receiving the payoff, F (1, 129) = 21.99, p < .001, η2 = 0.15. Altogether, partici-
pants in the enhanced anonymity condition felt more anonymous. 
3.2. Tax compliance 
We ran three linear mixed effects models with relative tax compliance as dependent variable. We entered a random
intercept for individuals in all three models to account for the repeated measures data structure ( N = 131, leading to 1572
observations in 12 rounds). Model 1 included only the anonymity manipulation as a fixed effect, and Model 2 included only
the tax-related parameters as fixed effects. In Model 3, we entered the anonymity manipulation, the tax-related parameters,
and the interactions of these two as fixed effects. All models are presented in Table 1 . 
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Table 1 
Linear mixed effects models with relative tax compliance as dependent variable. 
Variables Relative tax compliance 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
B SE p B SE p B SE p 
Intercept 0.59 0.03 < .001 0 .41 0 .03 < .001 0 .39 0 .04 < .001 
Anonymity 0.03 0.05 .569 0 .04 0 .06 .439 
Tax rate −0 .07 0 .01 < .001 −0 .08 0 .02 < .001 
Audit probability 15% 0 .18 0 .02 < .001 0 .19 0 .02 < .001 
Audit probability 25% 0 .32 0 .02 < .001 0 .34 0 .02 < .001 
Fine level 0 .12 0 .01 < .001 0 .12 0 .02 < .001 
Anonymity x Tax rate 0 .01 0 .03 .752 
Anonymity x Audit prob. 15%. −0 .02 0 .04 .538 
Anonymity x Audit prob. 25% −0 .04 0 .04 .225 
Anonymity x Fine level 0 .00 0 .03 .953 
Note. N individuals = 131 over 12 rounds; N observationsTotal = 1572. Anonymity was coded with 0 = regular anonymity and 1 = enhanced anonymity. 
Tax rate was coded with 0 = 20% and 1 = 40%. Audit probability was dummy coded with 5% as reference category. Fine level was coded with 
0 = payback plus 0.5x evaded amount and 1 = payback plus 1.5x evaded amount. 
Fig. 2. Mean relative tax compliance over the 12 rounds by condition. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
Fig. 3. Mean relative tax compliance for all levels of the tax-related parameters by condition. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. These were 







3.2.1. Model 1: effect of anonymity on tax compliance 
The manipulation of regular versus enhanced anonymity had no significant effect on tax compliance (see Table 1 ). Fig. 2
reveals that compliance levels were close to congruent. Hence, we found no indication that tax compliance decisions in the
lab change under a condition of enhanced anonymity. 
To get an estimate of the standardized mean difference between the two conditions, we compared mean relative com-
pliance over the twelve rounds between the two anonymity conditions with a t -test, t (128.77) = −0.56, p = .578. The
standardized effect size estimate was Cohen’s d = −0.10, 95% CI [ −0.44, 0.25]. 
3.2.2. Model 2: effects of tax-related parameters on tax compliance 
Compliance was influenced by all three tax-related parameters (see Table 1 and Fig. 3 ). Individuals’ relative compliance
was significantly lower tax in rounds with a tax rate of 40% compared to rounds of 20%. The effects of audit probability and











































fine rate indicated a clear deterrence effect. Com pliance was significantly higher when audits were more likely. Comparing
rounds with 5% to rounds with 15% audit probability, relative compliance increased by 18 percentage points. Moving from
15% to 25% increased relative compliance by another 14 percentage points. A fine rate of 1.5 times the evaded amount
increased relative compliance by 12 percentage points compared to a fine rate of 0.5. 
3.2.3. Model 3: Effects of anonymity, tax-related parameters, and their interactions on tax compliance 
Entering the interaction terms between the anonymity manipulation and each tax-related parameter did not affect the
previously described effects (see Table 1 ). None of the interaction terms was significant. Hence, the anonymity manipulation
did not moderate the effectiveness of any of the tax-related parameters (see Fig. 3 ). 
3.3. Exploratory results 
3.3.1. Instruction and attention checks 
The data contained multiple indicators of individuals’ understanding of and attention to the instructions: participants
were asked to (1) report the correct net income of three presented tax decisions after reading the instructions, (2) correctly
recall the presented tax rates, audit probabilities, and fine rates after the experimental task, (3) state whether they read
the instructions carefully, and (4) indicate whether they understood the instructions. We tested whether there is an effect
of the anonymity manipulation on compliance among participants who stated to understand the instructions or passed the
check items in separate models, respectively. Again, there was no effect of anonymity when controlling for any of these data
quality indicators ( p -values of anonymity on condition for the four models: p = .459, p = .623, p = .511, p = .633). 
3.3.2. Did the anonymity manipulation influence individuals’ perceptions and motives? 
After the experiment, participants were asked to recall their perceptions and motives during the task. Specifically, they
had to indicate whether they perceived the decisions in the experiment rather as paying taxes or as playing a game, whether
they thought of any moral aspects regarding their decisions, and whether they wanted to maximize their payoff or rather
pay their taxes due honestly. We assumed that perceptions of playing a game, lower levels of moral considerations, and
payoff maximization motives might be more prevalent in the enhanced anonymity condition. These assumptions were not
supported by the data as suggested by a MANOVA with the anonymity condition as independent variable and the five motive
items as dependent variables, F (5, 125) = 0.59, p = .706. Univariate results further supported this exploratory finding. 
4. Discussion 
Our study tested whether tax compliance in a classical experimental decision setting varies between different degrees
of anonymity. Specifically, we investigated whether compliance is more pronounced under conditions of regular anonymity
compared to enhanced anonymity, and whether these different degrees of anonymity moderate the effects of prominent
determinants of tax compliance. Our results do not support these assumptions. 
The absence of a significant interaction between the anonymity manipulation and any of the tax-related parameters is
reassuring, as it does not challenge published findings from experiments that do not employ such pronounced anonymity
measures, as for instance complete absence of experimenter-subject interactions. Our findings – in general and especially
with regard to the payment procedure – are in line with a recent study that shows that having participants enter their
names during the experiment for receipt preparation does not lead to more socially desirable answers ( Wolff, 2019 ). 
One important conclusion of our study is that past experiments investigating deterrence effects are thus not likely to
be considerably influenced or biased by social desirability. This also means that often observed high compliance rates in
tax experiments cannot be criticized for just being artifacts due to a lack of anonymity. Hence, on a more general level,
this could be interpreted as a fundamental difference between experiments in the context of tax behavior and economic
games, as for instance the dictator game, where some studies suggest that perceived anonymity influences the level of
contributions (e.g., Bull and Gibson-Robinson, 1981 ; Franzen and Pointner, 2012 ; Haley and Fessler, 2005 ; Hoffman et al.,
1994 ; Kurzban, 2001 ; Thielmann et al., 2016 ). One potential explanation for this discrepancy is that our setting (as usual
in a standard tax game) did not rely on a public goods structure. Employing such a structure, where the payoff of other
participants is directly influenced by own contributions, could increase the influence of anonymity on contribution behavior.
Besides its significance for designing and interpreting experimental studies on tax compliance, our study also contributes
to the more general issue of whether studies on cheating and ethical decision making could be biased due to minor
anonymity breaches. Experimental approaches like the popular die-under-cup paradigm ( Shalvi et al., 2011 ) have been de-
signed in order to study cheating in a setting where it is transparently clear to participants that they cannot be observed
by the experimenter. Comparing such an approach to rather traditional lab experiments to study unethical behavior, our
results seem to indicate that the differences might be negligible, as long as participants perceive the level of anonymity as
sufficient, keeping in mind that in both our conditions participants did not indicate anonymity to be low or insufficient. 
One limitation of the present study is that we only tested the moderating role of anonymity for the effects of classical
tax-related parameters on compliance. It remains an open question whether anonymity has an influence on, for instance,
effects of fairness or social norms, although we have no evidence that social desirability would play a stronger role in such
a context. 


































Besides that, one could argue that our sample size was not large enough to detect smaller difference between the two
conditions. The sample size provided power of 0.80 to detect an effect in the range of Cohen’s d = 0.50. Admittedly, a larger
sample would have been preferable to obtain a higher chance to detect a potentially smaller effect. However, the obtained
effect estimate (Cohen’s d = −0.10, 95% CI [ −0.44, 0.25]) suggests that any effect is likely to be in the range of a small effect.
Hence, we are confident to infer from the data that there are no large effects of regular versus enhanced anonymity. 
We must emphasize that our study compared a situation of regular anonymity against one of enhanced anonymity. This
means that we did not have a low anonymity condition in absolute terms, which would reflect severe formal breaches
of anonymity. Absolute anonymity perceptions are also quite high in the enhanced anonymity condition, as, for instance,
identifying individuals’ identities in the experimental data obtained was not possible in either condition. However, we do
observe a successful manipulation (in terms of our operationalization) with substantial differences in self-stated experienced
anonymity between the two conditions, especially for experienced anonymity during the experimental task and for the
payment procedure ( η2 = 0.06 and η2 = 0.15, respectively), most likely due to the interaction with the experimenter. Hence,
our study tested a small, but practically important difference in experimental design. 
We do believe that general anonymity concerns are relevant and our results should not be interpreted as a justification
to neglect the importance of anonymity in experimental research. However, they also provide evidence that often-used
standard procedures in tax experiments are sufficient to guarantee a satisfactory level of anonymity. Thus, we are confident
that the present study contributes to the field of tax research by offering useful insights into how to design experiments
and especially in helping to evaluate existing findings in the literature. 
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